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TOTAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Appellant

vs.

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT and WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,
Respondents
'"•

·~ ..

FILED - ORIGINAL
Jlt-83119
Sl"8iiiii court _court at Appeals

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

EnleretlonATSby:_ -

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County.
Honorable Judge Sticklen presiding

ROATS LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Richard T. Roats, Residing in Boise, Idaho, for Appellant
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, P.A. Respondent Ada County Highway Dist.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP Respondent Washington Mutual Bank
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case
This case involves the district court's denial of Appellant Total Success
Investments, LLC's (Total Success) request for a Writ of Mandate.
Course of proceedings below and disposition
On April 15, 2008, Total Success submitted its Verified Application for
Alternative Writ of Mandate and supporting exhibits. R. 3-29. Respondent Ada County
Highway District ("ACHD") responded on June 13, 2008. R. 42-46. In its Memorandum
Decision and Order, the district court (Judge Sticklen) denied Total Success' Application
for Alternative Writ of Mandate. R. 47-54. On January 26, 2009, the district court
(Judge Carey) officially issued an order dismissing the Application. R. 57-58. Judge
Carey awarded ACHD $54.00 in costs. R. 53-54. Washington Mutual received an award
of$4,019.50 in costs, including attorney fees. R. 66-73.

Concise statement of the facts
Total Success owns land abutting an alley that is twelve feet wide and travels
from State Street to Dewey Street in Boise. The alley was formally dedicated as part of
the Cruzen Addition in 1906. R. 12. Encroaching upon this alley are utility poles owned
by Idaho Power, and landscaping, including shrubs and dilapidated railroad ties owned by
Washington Mutual (WaMu)1. R. 6

,r,r 9,

10. At approximately three feet at the widest

point, the encroachments eliminate almost 25% of the twelve-foot alley. REPORTER'S
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL, p. 24, 11. 11-17.

1

Both Idaho Power and WaMu have

WaMu successor in interest is Chase Bank.
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agreed to remove the encroachments at the request of ACHD, but ACHD retracted its
request and now refuses to make such a request. R. 48,

7,r,r 13, 14.

Consequently, Total

Success sought a Writ of Mandate requesting that ACHD require the removal of Idaho
Power's power poles and WaMu's landscaping. R. 3C. The district court dismissed the
Application for the Writ; from that dismissal, Total Success appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I. Whether the district court improperly applied the law when it denied Appellant's
Application for Writ ofM,mdate.
2. Whether the district court ened in concluding that an award of attorney fees was
appropriate.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On appeal from a decision denying a writ of mandamus this Court's task is to
apply the same standard required of the district court." Brady v. City of Homedale, 130
Idaho 569, 571 (1997). The authority to issue a writ of mandamus derives from Idaho
Code§ 7-302, which provides:

It may be issued by the supreme court or any district court to any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act
which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station; or to compel the admission of a party to the use and the enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully
precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred in its Statutory Application by Failing to Consider
the Permissive Portion of Idaho Code§ 40-2319(1)

When a writ of mandamus regards discretionary acts, the writ is appropriate when
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"it clearly appears that [the actor] acted arbitrarily and unjustly and in abuse of the

discretion vested .... " Brady, 130 Idaho at 571 (1997) (emphasis added). The party
seeking the writ must have a clear right to have the act performed, and the officer against
whom the writ is sought must have a clear duty to act. Kolp v. Bd. of Trustees of Butte
County Joint School District No. 111,102 Idaho 320, 323 (1981 ).
Below, Total Success based its Application on Idaho Code § 40-2319(1), which
reads as follows:
If any highway or public right-of-way under the jurisdiction of a county or
highway district is encroached upon by gates, fences, buildings, or
otherwise, the appropriate county or highway district may require the
encroachment to be removed. If the encroachment is of a nature as to
effectually obstruct and prevent the use of the highway or public right-ofway for vehicles, the county or highway district shall immediately cause
the encroachment to be removed.

This statute describes some highway district actions as discretionary and some as
mandatory.

When a public right-of-way under the highway district's jurisdiction is

encroached upon, the highway district "may" require that the encroachment be removed.
This decision is discretionary.

When the encroachment "effectually obstruct[s] and

prevent[ s] the use of the ... right-of-way for vehicles," then the highway district "shall"
immediately cause the encroachment to be removed. This decision is mandatory.
In the district court's memorandum denying the Application, it applied the facts to
the law only with regard to the mandatory portion of the statute. In the court's limited·
discussion of the permissive portion of the statute, it simply rejected the possibility that
the Writ should have been granted, based on the fact that the statute vested ACHD with
some discretion over the matter. The court did not discuss whether ACHD acted
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arbitrarily and unjustly and in abuse of its discretion. Therefore, the court erred in its

application of the law.
Moreover, if the court had considered whether the permissive language warranted
the granting of the Application, it would have concluded that the Writ was appropriate.
In the court's discussion of the policies for granting ACHD discretion regarding the
permissive portion of the statute, it cited the following:
public policy considerations such as the cost of removing all
encroachments within a district could be a burdensome and impracticable
task. As such, highway districts are allowed the necessary discretion to
allocate the best use of their resources in removing encroachments that do
not rise to the level of obstruction so as to prevent the public's use of
property or roadways.
R. 52. In other words, ACHD has discretion because it needs to be able to allocate its
resources most effectively when encroachments do not prevent the public's use of a
roadway. However, this public policy is wholly inapplicable in this case. In the district
court's own memorandum, it stated that WaMu and Idaho Power both offered to move
their encroac!nnentsfor free. R. 48. The reason ACHD has discretion over the matter is
to save money, yet the grand total cost of removing the encroaclnnents would have been

zero dollars. Given the substantial impediment caused by the encroachments - over 25%
of the alley- as a matter of law, ACHD abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, and acted
unjustly in refusing to request that the encroachments be removed. As a result, Total
Success appropriately applied for a Writ of Mandate to require the removal of the
encroaclnnents.
Because the permissive portion was sufficient to warrant the granting of the
Application, and in the interest of judicial expediency, this Court should vacate the
district court's order dismissing the Application for Writ of Mandate, and grant the
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Application for the Writ of Mandate itself. Recall that the Writ "may be issued by the
supreme court." I.C. § 7-302.
Regardless, though, the district court did not fully apply the law, basing its ruling
on the incorrect assumption that a writ of mandate is always denied when the relevant
officer has discretion over the decision at issue. That conclusion is not true, as the writ
may be granted when, as is the case here, the relevant entity acted arbitrarily, unjustly,
and in an abuse of its discretion.
The District Court' Erred by Failing to Find that ACHD was Required to Act
under the Mandatory Portion of Idaho Code§ 40-2319(1)

Again, the mandatory portion of Idaho Code 40-2319(1) states: "If the
encroachment is of a nature as to effectually obstruct and prevent the use of the highway
or public right-of-way for vehicles, the county or highway district shall immediately
cause the encroachment to be removed." The district court's memorandum conceded that
the encroachments cause inconvenience, especially regarding parking issues, to those
who attempt to use the alley. R. 52-53. It did not mention, however, the fact that the
encroachments substantially prevent travel in one direction of the alley. REPORTER'S
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL, p. 68 II. 9-22. Because travel is prevented, the mandatory
portion of the statute is triggered and ACHD should be compelled to act.
However, the district court failed to consider this evidence.

It did consider

evidence that parking became more inconvenient as a result of the encroachments (R. 5253 ). From that evidence, it concluded that no obstruction and prevention of use occurred.
It does not follow, however, that no use is prevented, simply because some uses are not

prevented.

Some uses may be prevented by encroachments, even if others are not.
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Therefore, because the court did not consider evidence that some uses were prevented, it
erred in its application ofidaho Code§ 40-2319(1).
The District Court Erred in its Award of Attorney Fees

The district court's decision to award WaMu attorney fees was based on a false
and inadequate premise. It stated that
[r]egardless of whether there was a mandatory duty, a discretionary duty,
or no duty involved in the case, it is apparent that if Washington Mutual
owed a duty, it was not a duty "resulting from an office, trust or station."
Consequently there never was a statutory basis for asking the court to
issue a writ of mandate commanding Washington Mutual to do something.
The court, therefore, finds that the claim against Washington Mutual was
brought and pursued umeasonably and without foundation.
R. 69. The basis for the court's decision, then, was that no statutory basis existed for

requesting a writ of mandate requiring that WaMu remove the landscaping. A review of
the actual Application for the Writ, however, requires a different conclusion.

Total

Success requested the following in its prayer for relief: "that this court ... [i]ssue the
Writ of Mandate requiring that ACHD, Washington Mutual Bank and Idaho Power
Company to immediately. remove or cause the removal of the encroachments in the
alley." R. 8. There is no dispute that ACHD possessed the power to require WaMu to
remove the landscaping. Therefore, a request that ACHD "cause the removal" of the
encroachments is simply a request that ACHD exercise its authority over WaMu.
It is perfectly logical to conclude that a basis existed to request that WaMu be

required to act. There was a basis to require ACHD to act, and ACHD had the power to
require WaMu to act. Therefore, a mandate could require WaMu to act, because the
mandate could require ACHD to require WaMu to act. Again, there is no dispute that
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authority existed to require ACHD to act. Since ACHD could be required to act, WaMu
could be required to act by a writ of mandate requiring ACHD to require WaMu to act.
The district court's rationale, therefore, was flawed, and attorney fees were not
appropriately awarded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Total Success respectfully requests:

l. This Court vacate the district court's dismissal of Total Success' Application for
Writ of Mandate;
2. This Court grant the Writ of Mandate itself; and
3. This Court vacate the award of attorney fees to WaMu.

t<.
Respectfully Submitted t h i s ~ of June, 2009

Richard T. Roats
Attorney for Appellant
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